Cyber Threat Intelligence and BCSI Protection for NERC-Compliant Bulk Electric System Operations

Authors

  • Suchismita Chatterjee Cyber Security Product Specialist Expert Pacific Gas and Electric Company, USA Author

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.63503/aisem.67

Keywords:

Cyber Threat Intelligence, BCSI Protection, Bulk Electric System, NERC CIP, Cyber-Physical Security

Abstract

Cyber Threat Intelligence, Bulk Electric Systems Cyber System Information and NERC-compliant operations are all under threat in today's highly connected Bulk Electric Systems (BES) landscape due to information/operational technology and physical platforms converging. Current OT security solutions are mostly centered on anomaly detection and CTI sharing with less ability to foresee attacks and consequences aimed at BCSI, how attacks can propagate through the interconnected elements of a BES and the impact of attacks on these various assets. The current OT security concepts are mostly limited to anomaly detection and CTI sharing, having inadequate capability to predict a BCSI exposure, propagation of a cyberattack across interconnected BES assets and the impact of the cyberattack on these various assets. In this paper, BES-CTI Shield is presented, a Cyber-Physical DTwning able to incorporate temporal graph-based threat detection, BCSI exposure forecast, federated threat information sharing, adaptive Zero-Trust protection and policy reasoning guided by NERC-CIP security breach awareness. This framework is based upon elements of SCADA, HMI, network, authentication and physical-grid telemetry and is designed to create a dynamic cyber-physical representation of BES infrastructure. The numerical evaluations are based on 10 to 15 BES cyber-physical asset classes, 8,000 to 12,000 telemetry records, 1,000 to 1,500 attack events and 6 to 8 representative cyberattack scenarios. The proposed framework achieves 96.8–98.1% detection accuracy, 95.9–97.6% precision, 95.7–97.4% recall and 96.0–97.5% F1-score, with a mean detection latency of 1.6–2.1s. BCSI exposure prediction realizes 94.8-96.5% accuracy, while the accuracy of the attack-propagation is 93.5-95.2%. In comparison to the reference OT detection approach the framework provides a reduction in number of false-positive events of 28-34%, BCSI exposure error of 25-31% and communication overhead due to CTI of 24-29%. The results in this paper show the potential benefits of incorporating cyber-physical Digital Twin intelligence, predictive BCSI protection, NERC-CIP-aware reasoning and federated CTI to increase safe and secure BES operations.

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Published

2026-10-24